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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company appeals from 
an order of the district court declaring that it has a duty to 
defend its insured, Visiting Nurse Association of Greater 
Philadelphia (VNA), in a case brought against VNA by American 
Health Systems, Inc. (AHS), a competitor of VNA in the provision 
of home health care services, under the professional liability 
coverage it sold to VNA.  VNA cross appeals, preserving its 
contention that St. Paul's obligation to defend is also based on 
the comprehensive general liability coverage it purchased from 
St. Paul. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 VNA is a non-profit corporation engaged in the business 
of providing home health care and related services throughout the 
Delaware Valley.  Agencies such as VNA typically provide home 
health care to patients who are discharged from hospitals and 
require follow-up care.  Such agencies receive referrals from 
hospitals, which are required as a condition of participating in 
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the Medicare and Medicaid programs to transfer or refer their 
patients to appropriate facilities, agencies, or outpatient 
services as needed for follow-up or ancillary care.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1395x(ee); 42 CFR § 482.43(d).  The hospitals employ 
discharge planners to plan the appropriate transfer or referral 
of discharged patients. 
 St. Paul began providing insurance to VNA in 1988.     
That policy contains coverage for both professional liability and 
comprehensive general liability.  In February 1993 VNA was sued 
by AHS, another home health agency.  AHS's complaint contains 
claims against VNA under the antitrust laws, RICO and state law. 
Its antitrust claim count alleges that VNA violated sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in that it "conspired with 
various area hospitals in an attempt to monopolize the home 
health care market and destroy competition."  App. at 45. 
Essentially it alleges that VNA paid the salaries of the 
hospitals' discharge planners, who held themselves out as 
employees of their respective hospitals, and that this caused the 
hospitals to refer virtually all of their home care patients to 
VNA.  Two counts of AHS's complaint charge that VNA violated 
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), through a pattern of 
mail and insurance fraud, including disguise of the salaries of 
discharge planners as allowable costs in its annual cost reports 
and regular monthly claims.  Another count alleges that VNA 
intentionally interfered with AHS's prospective contractual 
relations with home care patients. 
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 After receiving the AHS complaint, VNA twice asked St. 
Paul to defend it in the AHS lawsuit, and St. Paul twice 
declined.  VNA then commenced the present diversity action in the 
district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that St. Paul was 
required to defend VNA in the lawsuit brought by AHS and a 
judgment for all monies expended by VNA and all liabilities 
incurred but not yet paid by VNA with respect to the defense of 
the AHS suit.  VNA also sought prejudgment interest, punitive 
damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. 
 VNA filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
duty to defend issue, and St. Paul moved for summary judgment on 
all issues.  On September 21, 1994, the district court entered an 
order denying St. Paul's motion for summary judgment and granting 
partial summary judgment to VNA, declaring that St. Paul has a 
duty to defend VNA in the AHS lawsuit.  The district court held 
that VNA is not entitled to coverage under the commercial general 
liability portion of the policy, but that St. Paul has a duty to 
defend under the professional liability provisions because AHS's 
claims arise out of the profession named in the policy.  The 
district court denied St. Paul's motion for reconsideration, and 
St. Paul timely filed a notice of appeal.  VNA timely filed a 
cross-appeal.   
 After the notices of appeal were filed, the district 
court, pursuant to agreement of counsel, dismissed VNA's claims 
for indemnification.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291.  
In re Emerson Radio Corp., 52 F.3d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1995); Cape 
May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983).  
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Our review of the district court's grant and denial of the 
summary judgment motions is plenary.  Pennsylvania Power Co. v. 
Local Union No. 272, 886 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1989).  The parties 
agree that Pennsylvania law controls the coverage issues. Because 
the material facts are not in dispute, the only issue before us 
is the legal question of determining the proper coverage of this 
insurance contract.  Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 
760 (3d Cir. 1985).   
II. 
Duty to Defend 
 The legal principles applicable to this case are well 
established.   In interpreting an insurance policy, the court 
must ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the 
language of the policy.  Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American 
Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983).  Where the 
language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be given 
its plain and ordinary meaning.  Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. 
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 
1967).  Where a provision of the policy is ambiguous, it must be 
construed in favor of the insured.  Standard Venetian, 469 A.2d 
at 566.  However, a court should read policy provisions to avoid 
ambiguities and not torture the language to create them.  St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 
F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 The obligation of an insurer to defend an action is 
fixed solely by the allegations in the underlying complaint. 
Humphreys v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 
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Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 598 A.2d 994 (Pa. 1991).  If the 
factual allegations of the complaint, taken as true, state a 
claim to which the policy potentially applies, the insurer must 
defend.  D'Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986).  If the complaint against the insured alleges 
facts that support a recovery covered by the policy, the insurer 
must defend the case until it can confine the claim to a recovery 
that the policy does not cover.  Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam 
Casualty Co., 152 A.2d 484, 488 (Pa. 1959).   
 St. Paul agreed to defend any suit brought against VNA 
"for covered claims."  App. at 12.  VNA contends that two 
portions of its policy with St. Paul give rise to the duty to 
defend: the professional liability provisions and the 
comprehensive general liability provisions.  We examine each in 
turn. 
A. 
 The professional liability coverage provision of the 
policy "provides protection against professional liability claims 
which might be brought against [VNA] in [its] professional 
practice."  App. at 12.  To be covered, "claims must be based on 
events that arise out of the profession named in the Coverage 
Summary," i.e., "home care providers."  App. at 11-12.  The 
policy further recites that this coverage protects VNA "against 
claims that result from professional services that were or should 
have been provided by anyone for whose acts [VNA was] legally 
responsible" and that St. Paul would "cover claims that result 
from the professional service [VNA] performed or should have 
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performed" after the applicable date.  App. at 12.  Other than 
the reference to "home care providers," the term "professional 
services" is not expressly defined in the professional liability 
portion of the policy. 
 In seeking to bring itself within this coverage,  VNA 
contends that the services it provides include discharge 
planning, that discharge planning is a professional service, and 
that the essence of AHS's claim against it is that the hospitals' 
discharge planners who were allegedly paid by VNA improperly 
steered patients to VNA and deprived them of information about 
and access to AHS's services.  Accordingly, VNA argues, St. Paul 
has a duty to defend because AHS's claim arises out of VNA's 
professional services and thus potentially falls within the 
policy's professional liability coverage. 
  In accepting VNA's position that St. Paul does have a 
duty to defend VNA under the professional liability portion of 
the policy, the district court rejected St. Paul's contentions 
that the AHS claims did not "'aris[e] out of' the profession 
named in the policy" and that the professional liability 
protection is limited to claims by clients or patients.  App. at 
83.  Instead, the court concluded that AHS's allegations of 
"monopolization and conspiracy by VNA in its attempt to destroy 
its competition in the business or profession of home care 
provider" are "'events that arise out of the profession named' in 
that VNA's actions relate to and involve its business or 
professional activities of providing home care."  App. at 83-84. 
The court found persuasive the opinions of the courts in 
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Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Casualty Co. v. Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, 
638 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1980), and Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 
600 (5th Cir. 1988), holding the insurer had a duty to defend 
under the professional liability coverage. 
 St. Paul argues that the district court erred in 
concluding that AHS's claims arise out of the profession named in 
the policy.  Its principal argument, however, is that the court 
failed to give effect to the language of the policy covering only 
claims that result from the providing or failure to provide 
professional services.   We note that the district court did not 
analyze the latter requirement, one that is repeated three times 
in the policy.  We believe that coverage under the professional 
liability portion of the policy can be disposed of by focusing on 
the meaning of "professional services," and the requirement that 
the claim sought to be covered must result from providing or 
failing to provide them. 
 This court had occasion in Harad v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 839 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1988), to consider how 
Pennsylvania would interpret the "professional services" language 
in the context of an insurance contract.  Harad, an attorney, 
represented a client sued by Catania.  During the litigation 
Harad signed a verification to an answer and counterclaim filed 
on behalf of his client which alleged that Catania conspired or 
contrived to defraud Harad's client by concealing or 
misrepresenting certain facts.  Catania later sued Harad for 
malicious prosecution, and The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 
one of his liability insurers, declined to defend.  The policy 
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Aetna had written for Harad was a business liability policy that 
excluded claims "arising out of the rendering or failure to 
render any professional service."  Id. at 983 (emphasis omitted). 
 This court held that Aetna had no duty to defend, 
because Harad's action that was the basis of Catania's lawsuit 
fell into the category of "professional service" and was 
therefore excluded by the professional liability exclusion.  We 
adopted the generally held view that a "professional service" 
must be "such as exacts the use or application of special 
learning or attainments of some kind. . . .  A 'professional' act 
or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, 
or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill." 
Id. at 984 (quotation omitted). The relevant consideration is not 
the title or character of the party performing the act but the 
act itself.  Id.  We noted that the acts for which Harad had been 
sued by Catania, the drafting and signing of pleadings, clearly 
were "professional in nature and go to the heart of the type of 
services an attorney provides to his clients."  Id. at 984-85.  
 We noted the distinction between "two very different 
and often overlooked components" in the practice of law, as well 
as in other similarly regulated professional activity -- "the 
professional and the commercial."  Id. at 985.  The professional 
aspect "involves the rendering of legal advice to and advocacy on 
behalf of clients for which the attorney is held to a certain 
minimum professional and ethical standards."  Id.  On the other 
hand, the commercial aspect involves "the setting up and running 
of a business," including such tasks as securing office space, 
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hiring staff, paying bills, and collecting on accounts 
receivable.  Id. 
 We stated that given the dual nature of the practice of 
law, a lawyer's liability should be assessed depending on the 
role the lawyer was playing at the time the potential liability 
arose.  For example, if a lawyer is sued because a guest in the 
lawyer's office is injured tripping over the lawyer's briefcase, 
the lawyer's liability would not derive from the rendering of a 
professional service but from the operation of a business.  Id.  
  We concluded that Harad's liability was professional in 
nature because it derived solely from the provision of legal 
services, and thus fell within the exclusion from Aetna's 
Business Owners Policy (Deluxe) for professional services.  Cf. 
Knorr v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 90 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1952) (no duty to defend owner of beauty parlor 
against claim by customer injured when hair dryer fell and struck 
her head, where policy excluded "injuries arising from the 
'rendering of any professional services,'" and term "professional 
services" referred to "technical work performed by beauticians, 
hair-dressers, etc.," including drying of hair). 
 For purposes of this opinion, we accept VNA's 
contention that discharge planning may involve professional 
services as that term is understood in the policy.  However, AHS 
has not based its suit against VNA on any aspect of the 
application of any specialized skills, knowledge, learning, or 
attainments by the discharge planners.  Even if the hospitals' 
discharge planners are treated as VNA's employees, VNA's 
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liability to AHS, if any, derives from AHS's claims that VNA 
conspired with hospitals to monopolize referrals, engaged in a 
pattern of racketeering activity, and interfered with AHS's 
prospective contractual relations with patients.  Similar 
allegations could be made against any business competing for 
referrals or customers.  These allegations stem from VNA's effort 
to operate its business, not from any professional services that 
were or should have been provided by the discharge planners, and 
thus do not even potentially fall within the policy's coverage. 
Cf. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 620 
N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ill. 1993) (no duty to defend where claims 
alleging that insureds "committed intentional business torts and 
engaged in unfair competitive practices" did not "arise or result 
because of the insureds' performance of real estate services," 
the service listed in policy's definition of "professional 
services"). 
 Of course, disposition in each case will depend upon 
the specific language of the provisions defining the coverage and 
exclusions of a particular policy.  This is illustrated by the 
decision of a Pennsylvania appellate court which had occasion, in 
a case brought after Harad, to consider whether a policy covering 
professional services applied to a suit brought against the 
insured for wrongful termination.  In that case, Biborosch v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal 
denied, 615 A.2d 1310 (Pa. 1992), the insured, Biborosch, was the 
general insurance agent and manager of a general insurance agency 
engaged in selling and servicing insurance policies for Penn 
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Mutual Life Insurance Company and Penn Insurance and Annuity 
Company (collectively, "Penn").  Biborosch's duties as manager 
included recruiting, training, and supervising agents and 
brokers.   
 Biborosch and Penn terminated an agent who then sued 
them, alleging tortious interference with contractual relations, 
breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Biborosch was covered by a 
professional liability policy issued by Transamerica Insurance 
Company, which provided coverage for "[a]ny act, error or 
omission of the INSURED . . . in the rendering or failing to 
render PROFESSIONAL SERVICES . . . in the conduct of the NAMED 
INSURED'S profession as Life Underwriter, [or] Licensed Life, 
Accident and Health Insurance General Agent or Manager."  Id. at 
1052 (emphasis added).  The term "professional services" was 
defined as "those services necessary or incidental in the conduct 
of the insurance business" of Biborosch, including the sale and 
servicing of various insurance policies, annuities, and employee 
benefit plans, and related advice, consultation, and 
administration.  Id. 
 The court held that Transamerica had a duty to defend 
Biborosch, because Transamerica "specifically insure[d] Biborosch 
not only as an insurance broker, but also as a general agent or 
manager."  Id. at 1053.  This "crucial aspect" of the policy 
brought the agent's lawsuit potentially within the coverage of 
the policy.  Id.  Biborosch's termination of the agent was an act 
"committed in the course of rendering professional services as 
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general manager of the agency," thus satisfying the policy's 
requirement that covered acts "must have been performed in the 
conduct of the insured's profession as, inter alia, an insurance 
broker and insurance general agent or manager."  Id. 
 Relying on Harad, Transamerica argued that the agent's 
complaint did not fall within the potential coverage of its 
policy because Biborosch's actions in terminating the agent were 
related to "running the business" of the agency and were not 
"professional" in nature.  Transamerica contended that Harad 
compelled the conclusion that personnel decisions are not 
professional in nature.  The court stated that while it "might 
agree with the statements of the Harad court in a case that 
presented the same issue as was presented there," it did not find 
Harad apposite to the case before it.  Id. at 1055.  Harad did 
not involve a policy with "its own expansive definition of 
'professional services,' specifically including all acts 
'necessary or incidental' to the conduct of the insured's 
insurance business and administration in connection therewith." 
Id.  More importantly, Harad did not construe a policy insuring 
against "liability arising from the performance of the profession 
of general manager of a business."  Id.  Unlike a policy insuring 
a lawyer acting as a lawyer, or a doctor acting as a doctor, the 
Transamerica policy insured Biborosch "when acting as insurance 
broker and when acting as general manager" and defined general 
manager of an agency as a covered profession.  Id. 
 In contrast to the more expansive coverage in 
Biborosch, St. Paul merely agreed to cover claims "aris[ing] out 
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of the profession named in the Coverage Summary" ("home care 
providers") and resulting from "professional services that were 
or should have been provided."  App. at 11-12.  Inasmuch as St. 
Paul, unlike Transamerica, did not define "profession" or 
"professional services" to include conduct "necessary or 
incidental in the conduct of [VNA's] business," it is not 
required to defend claims that result from VNA's operation of a 
business.  AHS's claim arises from VNA's competition for clients, 
a business activity, rather than from its provision of 
professional services. 
 The district court relied heavily on Jefferson-Pilot 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, 638 F.2d 670 
(4th Cir. 1980), a case that has some facial similarity in that 
the issue was coverage under a professional services policy for 
an antitrust claim against the insured.  In that case the 
insured, Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, a law firm, was sued by a 
client who claimed the firm had unlawfully conspired with 
Suburban Savings and Loan Association to require Suburban's 
borrowers to use Boothe for legal work involved in obtaining real 
estate loans.  The policy required Jefferson-Pilot, Boothe's 
professional liability insurer, to defend any suit against Boothe 
raising "any claim made against the insured arising out of the 
performance of professional services for others in the insured's 
capacity as a lawyer . . . and caused by any act, error or 
omission of the insured or any other person for whose acts the 
insured is legally liable."  Id. at 674.  Inasmuch as the 
client's claim was that he and members of the class he 
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represented were "compelled to purchase legal and related 
services from attorneys not of their choosing at fees greater 
than those which could be obtained elsewhere and of a quality not 
best suited to their individual needs," id. at 672 n.2, that 
court concluded that the antitrust claim arose out of Boothe's 
"performance of professional services" for the plaintiffs within 
the meaning of the policy.    
 In this case, the district court rejected St. Paul's 
argument distinguishing the Jefferson-Pilot case on the ground 
that there the claim had been asserted by the client of the 
insured lawyer.  Although the court was correct in noting that 
St. Paul's policy language is not written in terms of the 
category of person asserting the claim, in each case the issue is 
whether the underlying claim is covered by the policy.  When the 
claim is one asserted by the client, i.e., the user of the 
professional services, it would most likely follow that the claim 
will be covered by a professional services policy.  See, e.g., 
Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1988) (duty 
to defend attorney against suit by client alleging false tax 
information and advice).  When the claim is one brought by a 
competitor, it is far less likely to be within that coverage 
unless, of course, the policy language is broader than that 
written by St. Paul which limits the covered claims to those that 
"result from professional services that were or should have been 
provided."  App. at 12 (emphasis added).   
 Even if we were to assume that AHS's claim "arises out 
of" VNA's profession, the language on which the district court 
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focused, it does not result from any professional services, i.e., 
services that require specialized skill, knowledge, learning, or 
attainments that VNA provided or failed to provide.  We note that 
the professional liability policy here, taken as a whole, 
unambiguously provides that covered claims must both arise out of 
VNA's profession and result from professional services that were 
or should have been provided, and therefore conclude that St. 
Paul does not have a duty to defend VNA under the professional 
liability provisions.  Cf. Central Dakota Radiologists v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 769 F. Supp. 323, 326 (D.N.D. 1991) 
("While [injury] 'arising out of' [the performance of 
professional services] may be construed to include conduct 
collaterally related to the actual performance of professional 
services, the more restrictive [injury] 'caused by' [the 
rendering or failure to render professional services] may not."). 
B. 
 VNA cross-appeals, arguing that the district court 
erred in holding that it was not entitled to coverage under the 
commercial general liability portion of the policy.  This 
provides coverage for "amounts any protected person is legally 
required to pay as damages for covered personal injury that . . . 
is caused by a personal injury offense."  App. at 21.  Personal 
injury is defined to mean "injury, other than bodily injury or 
advertising injury, caused by a personal injury offense."  App. 
at 22.  Personal injury offense includes, inter alia, 
"[i]nterfering with the rights provided to a person by a 
Patients' Bill of Rights or any similar law."  Id.  St. Paul 
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agreed to defend "any claim or suit for covered injury or damage 
made or brought against any protected person."  App. at 23. 
 According to VNA, AHS's complaint alleges that VNA 
deprived patients of the right to be provided the necessary 
information to make decisions about their health care options. 
VNA contends that such a right is inherent in all patients' bills 
of rights, whether mandated by state or federal law or by private 
associations.  VNA concedes that AHS does not expressly claim 
that this alleged deprivation is the basis for its lawsuit but 
argues that the "factual basis" for AHS's complaint demonstrates 
that such conduct is the "focal point" of AHS's lawsuit.  Brief 
for VNA at 18. 
 However, while the AHS complaint contains 104 numbered 
paragraphs detailing VNA's claims under the Sherman Act, RICO, 
and state common law, VNA cites only two paragraphs that 
assertedly touch on patients' rights.  The first states that home 
care patients are typically 65 years of age or older and are 
"rarely knowledgeable about the scope of Home Health Agencies and 
the nature of their services.  The strenuous events preceding the 
discharge from the hospital add to the confusion of these elderly 
patients, who become almost totally dependent upon the expertise 
of the hospital staff for information on home care."  App. at 43 
(¶ 29 of AHS Complaint).  The second recites that "the patients 
lost their freedom to choose among the home health care providers 
operating in the relevant geographic market since the discharge 
planners, placed and paid by VNA, held themselves out to be 
employees of Defendant Hospitals and under such purported 
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'neutral' role steered patients to VNA."  App. at 60 (¶ 95(b) of 
AHS Complaint). 
 We believe that the district court succinctly and 
correctly disposed of VNA's contention.  The court noted that 
AHS's complaint does not implicate the patients' bill of rights, 
that such a right belongs to the patient, not to a home care 
provider, and that no patient alleged any claim in connection 
with information received or not received about home health care. 
App. at 79.  We agree.  Thus, we reject VNA's contention that the 
district court erred in holding that St. Paul has no duty to 
defend under the commercial general liability portion of the 
policy. 
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the district court granting partial summary judgment to VNA and 
remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to St. 
Paul. 
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  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, United States District Judge for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
